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FEDERAL RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS NoT
ToLLED BY FILING COMPLAINT UNDER RuLE 3-Plaintiff's cause of action arose
out of a highway accident that occurred on October 1, 1943. Basing jurisdiction
on diversity of citizenship, he brought suit in a United States District Court in
Kansas. The complaint was filed on September 4, 1945, and defendant was
served on December 28, 1945. In Kansas, the two-year statute qf limitations
applicable to such tort claims is tolled by service on the defendant, not by filing
the complaint. Held, plaintiff ·is barred by the Kansas statute of limitations.
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., Inc., (U.S. 1949) 69 S.Ct.
1233.
Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United
States provides: "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court."1 This rule has been construed by federal district and circuit courts as
governing not merely how an action is commenced, but also when it is com·
menced.2 The reason for the Supreme Court's holding becomes clear when the
history of the governing law and procedure in federal courts is examined. In
1938, the Supreme Court re-interpreted the Rules of Decision Act3 and held
that state decisional as well as statutory law should govern "substantive" matters
in the federal courts. 4 In the same year, the Supreme Court promulgated the
Rules of Civil Procedure.5 For purposes of determining whether a given rule
is "substantive" or "procedural," and hence whether it is binding upon a federal
court, the Supreme Court has demonstrated that conllict of laws characterizations
do not control. 6 For all practical purposes, the substance-procedure dichotomy
seems to have disappeared. The controlling factor now appears to be whether
application of the state rule will significantly affect the outcome of the litiga-

1 Promulgated by the Supreme Court under authority of the Enabling Act of 1934, 48
Stat. L. 1064 (1934), as revised, 28 U.S.C. (1948) §2072. The Rules became effective Sept.
16, 1938.
2 Cases cited note 8, infra. The Advisory Committee's note to Rule 3 left open the
question whether filing the complaint would toll a state statute of limitations. Note that the
Enabling Act provided, "Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive
rights of any litigant."
3 "The laws of the several states ... shall be regarded as rules of decision ••. in the courts
of the United States, in cases where they apply." Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20, §34, 1 Stat. L.
92 (1848), as revised 28 U.S.C. (1948) §1652.
4 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938). Formerly, under
the interpretation given the act by Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 1 (1842), the federal
courts were required to follow state statutes and court decisions pertaining to matters of local
law only; they were free to make their own decisions on questions of general law.
5 Note 1, supra. Prior to adoption of the Rules, federal courts were required to follow
the procedure of the courts of the state in which they were sitting "as near as may be." Con·
formity Act of 1872, 17 Stat. L. 197 (1873), repealed by P.L. 773, 80th Cong., 2d sess.,
c. 646 Qune 25, 1948).
6 Burden of proof has usually been labeled "procedural" for conflicts purposes. Yet the
state rule regarding burden of proof has been held binding on federal and district courts:
Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 60 S.Ct. 201 (1939); Palmer v. Hoffman,
318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477 (1943).
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tion; if so, the federal court must apply it. 7 While the federal courts have applied
state statutes of limitations·in legal actions, they have generally held that filing
the complaint tolled the statute, regardless of the state rule on this point.8 In
actions equitable in nature they have applied state statutes of limitations, or the
doctrine of laches, depending upon the circumstances of the case.9 The procedure in equity suits was changed by Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.10 Therein, the
Supreme Court characterized a United States District Court, having jurisdiction
merely by reason of diversity of citizenship, as "only another court of the State"11
and held that it was required to apply the state statute of limitations.12 The
principal case requires a district court, in legal actions, to apply not only the state
statute of limitations but also the state rule governing the manner in which it is
tolled. 13 It is clear, then, that the "outcome of the litigation" test continues to
be the guide in determining whether a state rule, which might be classified as
procedural for some purposes, must be applied by a district court in diversity
cases. 14 Whatever may be said of the propriety of the test,15 it effectuates the
7 "And so the question is not whether a statute of limitations is deemed a matter of
'procedure' in some sense. The question is whether such a statute concerns merely the manner
and the means by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced, or whether
such statutory limitation is a matter of substance in the aspect that alone is relevant to our
problem, namely, does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to
disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by
the same parties in a State court?" Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 at 109, 65
S.Ct. 1464 (1945).
s Gallagher v. Carroll, (D.C. N.Y. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 568; Schram v. Koppin, (D.C.
Mich. 1940) 35 F. Supp. 313; O'Leary v. Loftin, (D.C. N.Y. 1942) 3 F.R.D. 36; Reynolds
v. Needle, (App. D.C. 1942) 132 F. (2d) 161; International Pulp Equipment Co. v. St. Regis
Kraft Co., (D.C. Del. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 860; Isaacks v. Jeffers, (C.C.A. 10th, 1944)
144 F. (2d) 26, cert. den. 323 U.S. 781, 65 S.Ct. 270 (1944); Krisor v. Watts, (D.C. Wis.
1945) 61 F. Supp. 845; Fleming v. Weisberg, (D.C. N.Y. 1947) 7 F.R.D. 47; Robinson v.
Waterman S.S. Co., (D.C. N.J. 1947) 7 F.R.D. 51; contra: Yudin v. Carroll, (D. C. Ark.
1944) 57 F. Supp. 793; Zuckerman v. McCulley, (C.C.A. 8th, 1948) 170 F. (2d) 1015.
9 3 OHLINGER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 20 (1948); 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 2d ed.,
733 (1948).
10 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464 (1945). See also Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 67
S.Ct. 1340 (1947).
11 326 U.S. 99 at 108, 65 S.Ct. 1464 (1945).
12 But see Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 66 S.Ct. 582 (1946) wherein the
suit was to enforce a right created by federal statute, with the sole remedy in equity. Held:
district court not bound by the state statute of limitations; the York case was distinguished.
1 3 At least where the suit is to enforce a state-created right. The principal case distin- .
guished Bomar v. Keyes, (C.C.A. 2d, 1947) 162 F. (2d) 136, cert. den. 332 U.S. 825, 68
S.Ct. 166 (1947), rehearing den. 332 U.S. 845, 68 S.Ct. 266 (1947). In that case, suit
was brought to enforce a right that arose under a federal statute. Held: filing the complaint
tolled the state statute of limitations.
14 It appears that the principle of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins applies only to cases
where the federal court has jurisdiction merely by reason of diversity of citizenship, but the
Supreme Court has never specifically passed on the point. Stating that it is so limited: 17
HuGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE 13, §18514 (1940); Parker, "Erie v. Tompkins in Retrospect:
An Analysis of its Proper Area and Limits," 35 A.B.A.J. 19 at 85 (1949). Contra: Clark,
"State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins," 55
YALE L. J. 267 at 280 (1946).
15 See Justice Rutledge's dissent to the principal case and others in Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 69 S.Ct. 1221 at 1231 (1949).
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policy which the Supreme Court has said motivated the Erie v. Tompkins decision, namely, uniformity of result regardless of whether suit is brought in a
state court or, by reason of diversity of citizenship, in a federal court sitting in
that state.16
Clinton R. Ashford, S.Ed.

16 See, for example, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 at 496, 61
S.Ct. 1020 (1941).

